Market making by merchants, who obtain stock from suppliers and resell it to con sumers, is modeled as a two-stage pricing game with winner-take-all c ompetition for the inputs (in contrast to fixed-capacity models). The re is a unique, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) which is Walr asian for elastic demand and non-Walrasian for inelastic demand. Alte rnatively, when merchants first sell forward contracts to consumers a nd then compete for supplies, the unique SPNE is always Walrasian. Th us, the author has an equilibrium model in which Walrasian price aris es not from the benevolent actions of a fictitious auctioneer, but fr om optimal price-setting behavior of merchants. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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Thomas Gehrig, 1993.
"Intermediation in Search Markets,"
Discussion Papers
1058, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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