I present a model of competition between two market makers who are horizontally differentiated. I first show that absent a search market for buyers and sellers, there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria. These equilibria are payoff equivalent for market makers, but affect buyers' and sellers' welfare in opposite ways. Second, I analyze the model when buyers and sellers can also exchange the good in search markets. The model with search markets shares many features with existing models, yet allows competing intermediaries to net a profit in equilibrium. Interestingly, the model exhibits a complementarity between intermediaries' profits in the presence of search markets. Third, I show that every equilibrium in a game with market makers is also an equilibrium in an appropriately defined game with matchmakers
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Paper provided by Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft in its series Diskussionsschriften with number
dp0510.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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Jean-Charles Rochet Author-Email: rochet@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse & Jean Tirole Author-Email: tirole@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse, 2006.
"Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, Autumn.