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Is International Law Conducive To Preventing Looming Disasters?

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  • Anne van Aaken
  • Janis Antonovics
  • Anne Aaken

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  • Anne van Aaken & Janis Antonovics & Anne Aaken, 2016. "Is International Law Conducive To Preventing Looming Disasters?," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 7, pages 81-96, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:glopol:v:7:y:2016:i::p:81-96
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    11. Sandler,Todd, 2004. "Global Collective Action," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521542548.
    12. Büthe Tim, 2010. "Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A (P)Review," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 1-40, October.
    13. Aseem Prakash & Adrienne Héritier & Barbara Koremenos & Eric Brousseau, 2015. "Organizational Leadership and Collective Action in International Governance: An Introduction," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 6(3), pages 234-236, September.
    14. Anne van Aaken, 2009. "Effectuating Public International Law through Market Mechanisms?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(1), pages 33-57, March.
    15. Thomas Risse, 1999. "International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behavior in the Human Rights Area," Politics & Society, , vol. 27(4), pages 529-559, December.
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