When Are Commercial Loans Secured?
AbstractWe analyze the factors that influence the decision to secure a commercial loan. We find evidence that variables reflecting adverse selection, moral hazard, and the prospects for default all affect the likelihood a loan will be collateralized. We find no evidence in favor of the predictions of certain theoretical models that high-quality firms signal by providing collateral. Our results also show that lenders with less risk protection in the form of equity capital are more likely to require collateral, but that banks themselves are less likely to secure loans than nonbanks. Certain loan characteristics also influence the collateralization decision. Copyright 2004 by the Eastern Finance Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Eastern Finance Association in its journal The Financial Review.
Volume (Year): 39 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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