Are Debt and Incentive Compensation Substitutes in Controlling the Free Cash Flow Agency Problem?
Abstract"This paper investigates the governance implications of a firm's capital structure and managerial incentive compensation in controlling the free cash flow agency problem. The results suggest: debt and executive stock options act as substitutes in attenuating a firm's free cash flow problem; failure to incorporate the substitutability and endogeneity leads to underestimates of the magnitude and economic implication of the disciplinary role of both mechanisms; firm characteristics differ across the prevalence of debt usage versus option usage, suggesting the heterogeneity in the costs and benefits of the monitoring devices; and all the above effects are more pronounced in firms that tend to have more severe agency problem." Copyright (c) 2009 Financial Management Association International.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Financial Management Association International in its journal Financial Management.
Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0046-3892
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- Chen, Tsung-Kang & Liao, Hsien-Hsing & Chi, Cheng-Ming, 2014. "The economic consequences of regulatory changes in employee stock options on corporate bond holders: SFAS No.123R and structural credit model perspectives," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 381-394.
- Billett, Matthew T. & Garfinkel, Jon A. & Jiang, Yi, 2011. "The influence of governance on investment: Evidence from a hazard model," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 643-670.
- Ramzi Benkraiem, 2014. "Small business investment sensitivity of debt before and during the global crisis," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 1185-1196.
- Yusnidah Ibrahim & Md Mohan Uddin & Kamarun Nisham Taufil Mohd & Mohd Sobri Minai, 2013. "Agency Costs and the Long-Run Performance of Debt Issuers," Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance, Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, vol. 9(1), pages 67-87.
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