Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Subjective and Objective Evaluation of Incentive Stock Options

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr.

    (Yale School of Management)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Owners of incentive options invariably hold undiversified portfolios. This paper derives a model for the subjective and objective values of such options. The subjective value—the value to the holder—is less than the market value because the option is held in an undiversified portfolio and because it is exercised suboptimally from the market perspective. The objective value is the cost to the firm of issuing the option and lies between the market and subjective values. This value recognizes the suboptimal exercise but not the undiversified discount. The model, which is the Black-Scholes model with modified parameters, is simple to use.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?JB790201
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.

    Volume (Year): 79 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 2 (March)
    Pages: 453-488

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:79:y:2006:i:2:p:453-488

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JB/

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Optimal 10b5-1 Monetization
      by quantivity in Quantivity on 2011-09-27 07:02:52
    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Florian S. PETERS & Alexander F. WAGNER, 2008. "The executive turnover risk premium," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 08-11, Swiss Finance Institute.
    2. Jens Carsten Jackwerth & James E. Hodder, 2008. "Managerial Responses to Incentives: Control of Firm Risk, Derivative Pricing Implications, and Outside Wealth Management," CoFE Discussion Paper 08-07, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz.
    3. L. Rogers & José Scheinkman, 2007. "Optimal exercise of executive stock options," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 357-372, July.
    4. Carmona, Julio & León, Angel & Vaello-Sebastià, Antoni, 2012. "Does stock return predictability affect ESO fair value?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 223(1), pages 188-202.
    5. Frydman, Carola & Jenter, Dirk, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Research Papers 2069, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:79:y:2006:i:2:p:453-488. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.