The Subjective and Objective Evaluation of Incentive Stock Options
Abstract
Owners of incentive options invariably hold undiversified portfolios. This paper derives a model for the subjective and objective values of such options. The subjective value—the value to the holder—is less than the market value because the option is held in an undiversified portfolio and because it is exercised suboptimally from the market perspective. The objective value is the cost to the firm of issuing the option and lies between the market and subjective values. This value recognizes the suboptimal exercise but not the undiversified discount. The model, which is the Black-Scholes model with modified parameters, is simple to use.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.
Volume (Year): 79 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 453-488
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JB/
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Citations
Blog mentions
As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:- Optimal 10b5-1 Monetization
by quantivity in Quantivity on 2011-09-27 07:02:52
Cited by:
- L. Rogers & José Scheinkman, 2007. "Optimal exercise of executive stock options," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 357-372, July.
- Frydman, Carola & Jenter, Dirk, 2010.
"CEO Compensation,"
Research Papers
2069, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
- Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," CESifo Working Paper Series 3277, CESifo Group Munich.
- Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," NBER Working Papers 16585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Florian S. Peters & Alexander F. Wagner, 2012.
"The Executive Turnover Risk Premium,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
12-021/2/DSF30, Tinbergen Institute.
- Florian S. PETERS & Alexander F. WAGNER, 2008. "The executive turnover risk premium," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 08-11, Swiss Finance Institute.
- Jackwerth, Jens Carsten & Hodder, James E., 2008.
"Managerial Responses to Incentives: Control of Firm Risk, Derivative Pricing Implications, and Outside Wealth Management,"
MPRA Paper
11643, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hodder, James E. & Jackwerth, Jens Carsten, 2011. "Managerial responses to incentives: Control of firm risk, derivative pricing implications, and outside wealth management," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1507-1518, June.
- Jens Carsten Jackwerth & James E. Hodder, 2008. "Managerial Responses to Incentives: Control of Firm Risk, Derivative Pricing Implications, and Outside Wealth Management," CoFE Discussion Paper 08-07, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz.
- Carmona, Julio & León, Angel & Vaello-Sebastià, Antoni, 2012.
"Does stock return predictability affect ESO fair value?,"
European Journal of Operational Research,
Elsevier, vol. 223(1), pages 188-202.
- Carmona, Julio & León, Angel & Vaello-Sebastiá, Antoni, 2011. "Does Stock Return Predictability Affect ESO Fair Value?," QM&ET Working Papers 11-2, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica, revised 16 Jan 2012.
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