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Structure‐preserving transformations of epistemic models

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  • Christian W. Bach
  • Andrés Perea

Abstract

The prevailing approaches to modeling interactive uncertainty with epistemic models in economics are state‐based and type‐based. We explicitly formulate two general procedures that transform state models into type models and vice versa. Both transformation procedures preserve the belief hierarchies as well as the common prior assumption. By means of counterexamples it is shown that our procedures are not inverse to each other. However, if attention is restricted to maximally reduced epistemic models, then isomorphisms can be constructed and an inverse relationship emerges.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian W. Bach & Andrés Perea, 2023. "Structure‐preserving transformations of epistemic models," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(3), pages 693-719, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:61:y:2023:i:3:p:693-719
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13136
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    References listed on IDEAS

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