An auction with a buyout option occurring over continuous time with rules similar to eBay’s “buy it now†option is analyzed. It is shown that a risk averse seller facing risk neutral bidders will choose a buyout price low enough so that the buyout option is exercised with positive probability in equilibrium. Further, when the seller is risk averse and bidders are risk neutral, allowing the seller to offer a buyout option results in an ex ante Pareto improvement, compared to a similar auction without such an option.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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