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Executive-Legislative Conflicts and The Quest for Accountability in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy: A Case of the 8th National Assembly

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  • O. Celestine Jombo, PhD

    (Department of Public Administration, Adekunle Ajasin University Akungba Akoko, Ondo State, Nigeria)

Abstract

This paper examines the seemingly intractable tensions and frictions between the executive and legislative branches in Nigeria. Specifically, it interrogates the intricate political and personality issues that surrounded the recurring tension and open confrontation between the presidency and the 8th National Assembly between 2015 and 2019. Using a combination of both descriptive and analytical methods and through a review of the extant literature, the paper reaffirmed and established the primacy of the legislature as an institution of accountability under the Nigeria’s presidential system. The paper discovered that persistent conflicts and contradictions between the executive and legislative actors in Nigeria have made effective budget formulation and implementation a difficult task with far-reaching political and socio-economic consequences for the nation’s body politic. The rifts breed suspicion and hostility between the two branches of government, creates division in the legislature, brings distraction to the governance process and, ultimately, propels the resort to the culture of impunity and total disregard to the rule of law by the governing elites. The paper concludes that the constitutional provisions defining the interface between the executive and legislative branches are adequate to engender stable and accountable government. Nevertheless, the political actors across the executive-legislative divide must be ready to embrace the dictates of separation of powers as enshrined in the 1999 constitution, abide by the rules of democratic game, and collaborate to work for the interests of the Nigerian people.

Suggested Citation

  • O. Celestine Jombo, PhD, 2022. "Executive-Legislative Conflicts and The Quest for Accountability in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy: A Case of the 8th National Assembly," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 6(11), pages 665-674, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bcp:journl:v:6:y:2022:i:11:p:665-674
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:gig:joupla:v:3:y:2011:i:1:p:125-141 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
    3. Celestine Ojo Jombo & Omololu Fagbadebo, 2019. "Integrity Deficit as an Impediment to Effective Legislative Oversight in Nigeria," Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, in: Omololu Fagbadebo & Fayth Ruffin (ed.), Perspectives on the Legislature and the Prospects of Accountability in Nigeria and South Africa, pages 123-142, Springer.
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