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Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022. "Screening with Persuasion," Papers 2212.03360, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2025.
  2. Wei He & Jiangtao Li & Weijie Zhong, 2024. "Rank-Guaranteed Auctions," Papers 2408.12001, arXiv.org.
  3. Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
  4. Chen, Yi-Chun & Yang, Xiangqian, 2023. "Information design in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  5. Kevin He & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Omer Tamuz, 2021. "Private Private Information," Papers 2112.14356, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2025.
  6. Tommaso Denti & Doron Ravid, 2023. "Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention," Papers 2306.09964, arXiv.org.
  7. Yi-Chun Chen & Gaoji Hu & Xiangqian Yang, 2022. "Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification," Papers 2210.16001, arXiv.org.
  8. Sosung Baik & Sung-Ha Hwang, 2022. "Revenue Comparisons of Auctions with Ambiguity Averse Sellers," Papers 2211.12669, arXiv.org.
  9. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2023. "Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2375, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  10. Stefan Seifert & Silke Hüttel, 2023. "Is there a risk of a winner’s curse in farmland auctions?," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 50(3), pages 1140-1177.
  11. Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2024. "Information Requirements for Mechanism Design," PIER Working Paper Archive 24-035, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  12. Jinsoo Bae & John H. Kagel, 2022. "Selling shares to budget-constrained bidders: an experimental study of the proportional auction," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 8(1), pages 45-55, December.
  13. Xu Lang, 2023. "A Belief-Based Characterization of Reduced-Form Auctions," Papers 2307.04070, arXiv.org.
  14. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors," Papers 2204.13726, arXiv.org.
  15. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Information-Robust Optimal Auctions," Papers 2205.04137, arXiv.org.
  16. Alexander Teytelboym & Shengwu Li & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(3), pages 709-750, July.
  17. Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler, 2021. "Persuasion with Ambiguous Receiver Preferences," Papers 2109.11536, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  18. Piotr Dworczak & Alessandro Pavan, 2022. "Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2017-2051, September.
  19. Yang Cai & Yingkai Li & Jinzhao Wu, 2024. "Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions," Papers 2403.08145, arXiv.org.
  20. Dirk Bergemann & Tan Gan & Yingkai Li, 2023. "Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules," Papers 2310.10024, arXiv.org.
  21. Pathikrit Basu, 2023. "Mechanism design with model specification," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(2), pages 263-276, August.
  22. Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2024. "Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1516, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  23. Rosenthal, Maxwell, 2023. "Robust incentives for risk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
  24. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022. "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  25. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Robust Private Supply of a Public Good," Papers 2201.00923, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
  26. Longjian Li, 2022. "Ambiguous Cheap Talk," Papers 2209.08494, arXiv.org.
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