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Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Dirk Bergemann

    (Yale University)

  • Tibor Heumann

    (Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile)

  • Stephen Morris

    (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Abstract

We characterize the bidders' surplus maximizing information structure in an optimal auction for a single unit good and related extensions to multi-unit and multi-good problems. The bidders seeks to find a balance between participation (and the avoidance of exclusion) and efficiency. The information structure that maximizes the bidders' surplus is given by a generalized Pareto distribution at the center of demand distribution, and displays complete information disclosure at either end of the Pareto distribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2024. "Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2375R1, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2375r1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007. "Information structures in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 580-609, November.
    2. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1557-1593, July.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris & Constantine Sorokin & Eyal Winter, 2022. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 371-388, September.
    4. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    5. Benjamin Brooks & Songzi Du, 2021. "Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1313-1360, May.
    6. Simon Loertscher & Ellen V. Muir, 2022. "Monopoly Pricing, Optimal Randomization, and Resale," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(3), pages 566-635.
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    Cited by:

    1. Philipp Strack & Kai Hao Yang, 2024. "Privacy‐Preserving Signals," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(6), pages 1907-1938, November.

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