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Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Mark Armstrong & Jidong Zhou, 2022. "Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 534-577, February.
  2. Roesler, Anne-Katrin & Deb, Rahul, 2021. "Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness," CEPR Discussion Papers 16206, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 494-514, November.
  4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Eduardo Perez‐Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Test Design Under Falsification," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1109-1142, May.
  6. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiangqian Yang, 2020. "Information Design in Optimal Auctions," Papers 2010.08990, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
  7. Chen, Yi-Chun & Yang, Xiangqian, 2023. "Information design in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  8. Navin Kartik & Weijie Zhong, 2023. "Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection," Papers 2305.02994, arXiv.org.
  9. Alex Suzdaltsev, 2020. "Distributionally Robust Pricing in Independent Private Value Auctions," Papers 2008.01618, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
  10. Toomas Hinnosaar & Keiichi Kawai, 2020. "Robust pricing with refunds," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 1014-1036, December.
  11. Carl Heese & Stephan Lauermann, 2021. "Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 112, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  12. Wanchang Zhang, 2021. "Correlation-Robust Optimal Auctions," Papers 2105.04697, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  13. Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
  14. Wanchang Zhang, 2021. "Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism," Papers 2105.05427, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  15. Tommaso Denti & Doron Ravid, 2023. "Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention," Papers 2306.09964, arXiv.org.
  16. In-Koo Cho & Jonathan Libgober, 2022. "Learning Underspecified Models," Papers 2207.10140, arXiv.org.
  17. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2018. "A Very Robust Auction Mechanism," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 16 Jan 2018.
  18. Stefan Seifert & Silke Hüttel, 2023. "Is there a risk of a winner’s curse in farmland auctions?," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 50(3), pages 1140-1177.
  19. Seifert, Stefan & Hüttel, Silke, 2020. "Common values and unobserved heterogeneity in farmland auctions in Germany," FORLand Working Papers 21 (2020), Humboldt University Berlin, DFG Research Unit 2569 FORLand "Agricultural Land Markets – Efficiency and Regulation".
  20. Yeon-Koo Che & Weijie Zhong, 2021. "Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods," Papers 2105.02828, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
  21. Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin & Morris, Stephen, 2020. "Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
  22. Satoshi Nakada & Shmuel Nitzan & Takashi Ui, 2022. "Robust Voting under Uncertainty," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 038, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
  23. Alex Suzdaltsev, 2020. "An Optimal Distributionally Robust Auction," Papers 2006.05192, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
  24. Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022. "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-281.
  25. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS
  26. Suzdaltsev, Alex, 2022. "Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
  27. Jonathan Libgober & Xiaosheng Mu, 2022. "Coasian Dynamics under Informational Robustness," Papers 2202.04616, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
  28. Tang, Rui & Zhang, Mu, 2021. "Maxmin implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
  29. Julio Backhoff-Veraguas & Patrick Beissner & Ulrich Horst, 2022. "Robust contracting in general contract spaces," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 917-945, June.
  30. Jin Xi & Haitian Xie, 2021. "Strength in Numbers: Robust Mechanisms for Public Goods with Many Agents," Papers 2101.02423, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
  31. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022. "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  32. S. Nageeb Ali & Nima Haghpanah & Xiao Lin & Ron Siegel, 2020. "How to Sell Hard Information," Papers 2010.08037, arXiv.org.
  33. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Robust Private Supply of a Public Good," Papers 2201.00923, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
  34. Longjian Li, 2022. "Ambiguous Cheap Talk," Papers 2209.08494, arXiv.org.
  35. Ethan Che, 2019. "Distributionally Robust Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints," Papers 1911.07103, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
  36. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors," Papers 2204.13726, arXiv.org.
  37. Jin Xi & Haitian Xie, 2023. "Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 649-683, October.
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