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Persuading the Principal to Wait

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Krishnamurthy Iyer & Haifeng Xu & You Zu, 2023. "Markov Persuasion Processes with Endogenous Agent Beliefs," Papers 2307.03181, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
  2. Gottardi, Piero & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2024. "Shuttle diplomacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
  3. Jan Knoepfle, 2024. "Dynamic Competition for Attention," Papers 2409.18595, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
  4. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi, 2021. "Relational communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
  5. Szydlowski, Martin, 2024. "Fomenting conflict," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
  6. Aïd, René & Bonesini, Ofelia & Callegaro, Giorgia & Campi, Luciano, 2025. "Continuous-time persuasion by filtering," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 127889, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  7. Deng, Kebin & Peng, Jiaxin & Peng, Juan & Zhang, Yuhua, 2022. "Real options with overextrapolation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
  8. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2022. "Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations," Papers 2204.08659, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.
  9. Yunfei (Jesse) Yao, 2024. "Dynamic Persuasion and Strategic Search," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(10), pages 6778-6803, October.
  10. Emeric Henry & Marco Loseto & Marco Ottaviani, 2022. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5330-5347, July.
  11. Jonas Hedlund & T. Florian Kauffeldt & Malte Lammert, 2021. "Correction to: Persuasion under ambiguity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 483-483, May.
  12. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2021. "Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 705-721, October.
  13. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Dima Shaiderman & Xianwen Shi, 2025. "Persuading while Learning," Working Papers tecipa-791, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  14. Hébert, Benjamin & Zhong, Weijie, 0. "Engagement maximization," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  15. Hyeonggyun Ko, 2025. "Persuasion in the Long Run: When history matters," Papers 2508.01662, arXiv.org.
  16. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2025. "Non-recursive dynamic incentives: a rate of convergence approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 20(4), November.
  17. Teddy Mekonnen & Zeky Murra-Anton & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2025. "Persuaded Search," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 133(10), pages 3167-3207.
    • Teddy Mekonnen & Zeky Murra-Anton & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2023. "Persuaded Search," Papers 2303.13409, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
  18. Li, Xuelin & Szydlowski, Martin & Yu, Fangyuan, 2025. "Dynamic information design in an entry game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
  19. Sina Khorasani & Ersin Körpeoğlu & Vish V. Krishnan, 2024. "Dynamic Development Contests," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 72(1), pages 43-59, January.
  20. Parakhonyak, Alexei & Vikander, Nick, 2023. "Information design through scarcity and social learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  21. Aïd, René & Bonesini, Ofelia & Callegaro, Giorgia & Campi, Luciano, 2025. "Continuous-time persuasion by filtering," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
  22. Orlov, Dmitry, 2022. "Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
  23. Kaya, Ayça, 2023. "Paying with information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
  24. Nuta, Shunya, 2024. "Starting rough, Dynamic persuasion with partial information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
  25. Henrique de Oliveira & Rohit Lamba, 2025. "Rationalizing dynamic choices," Papers 2504.05251, arXiv.org.
  26. I. Sebastian Buhai, 2025. "Reputation and Disclosure in Dynamic Networks," Papers 2512.22987, arXiv.org, revised May 2026.
  27. Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "Sequential Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
  28. Sebastian Gryglewicz & Aaron Kolb, 2025. "Strategic Pricing in Volatile Markets," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 73(1), pages 444-460, January.
  29. Maxim Senkov, 2022. "Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp734, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
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