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Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference

In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(3), pages 535-555, October.
  2. Guy Barokas, 2022. "Revealed desirability: a novel instrument for social welfare," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(4), pages 649-661, November.
  3. Haris Aziz & Barton E. Lee, 2020. "The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 1-45, January.
  4. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections," Papers 2008.08451, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
  5. Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal, 2023. "A Core-Partition Ranking Solution to Coalitional Ranking Problems," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 965-985, August.
  6. Bora Erdamar & José Luis Garcia-Lapresta & David Pérez-Roman & Remzi Sanver, 2012. "Measuring consensus in a preference-approval context," Working Papers hal-00681297, HAL.
  7. Richard Potthoff, 2013. "Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 101-122, January.
  8. Federica Ceron & Stéphane Gonzalez, 2019. "A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption," Working Papers halshs-02440615, HAL.
  9. Eric Kamwa, 2023. "On two voting systems that combine approval and preferences: fallback voting and preference approval voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 169-205, July.
  10. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2021. "Axioms for defeat in democratic elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 475-524, October.
  11. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2015. "The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 243-269, March.
  12. Steven Brams & Richard Potthoff, 2015. "The paradox of grading systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 193-210, December.
  13. Richard Potthoff, 2011. "Condorcet Polling," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 67-86, July.
  14. Santos-García, Gustavo & Alcantud, José Carlos R., 2025. "A characterization of pairwise dictatorial approbatory social welfare functions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 248(C).
  15. Eric Kamwa, 2018. "On the Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser," Working Papers hal-01786121, HAL.
  16. Güth, Werner & Vittoria Levati, M. & Montinari, Natalia, 2014. "Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 206-221.
  17. Eric Kamwa, 2023. "On Two Voting systems that combine approval and preferences: Fallback Voting and Preference Approval Voting," Working Papers hal-03614585, HAL.
  18. Guy Barokas & Yves Sprumont, 2022. "The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(1), pages 187-199, January.
  19. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 299-320, October.
  20. Alessandro Albano & José Luis García-Lapresta & Antonella Plaia & Mariangela Sciandra, 2023. "A family of distances for preference–approvals," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 323(1), pages 1-29, April.
  21. Maksim Gladyshev, 2019. "Vulnerability Of Voting Paradoxes As A Criteria For Voting Procedure Selection," HSE Working papers WP BRP 70/PS/2019, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  22. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2012. "Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 551-569, July.
  23. Alessandro Albano & José Luis García-Lapresta & Antonella Plaia & Mariangela Sciandra, 2024. "Clustering alternatives in preference-approvals via novel pseudometrics," Statistical Methods & Applications, Springer;Società Italiana di Statistica, vol. 33(1), pages 61-87, March.
  24. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2011. "When does approval voting make the "right choices"?," MPRA Paper 34262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Núñez, Matías, 2015. "Threshold voting leads to Type-Revelation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 211-213.
  26. Takashi Kurihara, 2020. "Net Borda rules with desirability," Working Papers 2002, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
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