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Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Marco Catola, 2019. "Contribution and bribe: lobbying in presence of incumbent and bureaucrat," Discussion Papers 2019/247, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  2. Amrita Kamalini Bhattacharyya & Vivekananda Mukherjee, 2019. "Lobbying and Bribery," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 7(2), pages 238-251, December.
  3. Bramoullé, Yann & Orset, Caroline, 2018. "Manufacturing doubt," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 119-133.
  4. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2020. "Subpoena power and informational lobbying," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 188-234, April.
  5. Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2018. "Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 385-421, March.
  6. Christopher Cotton, 2013. "Competing for the Attention of Policymakers," Working Papers 2013-14, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  7. Rocco d`Este & Mirko Draca & Christian Fons-Rosen, 2020. "Shadow Lobbyists," Working Papers Series inetwp139, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
  8. Cheng Li, 2020. "Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 527-557, April.
  9. David P Baron, 2019. "Lobbying dynamics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 403-452, July.
  10. Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie & Scervini, Francesco, 2023. "Strategic compromise, policy bundling and interest group power: Theory and evidence on education policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
  11. repec:osf:socarx:47e26_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Cotton, Christopher & Li, Cheng, 2016. "Clueless Politicians," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 274667, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
  13. Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad & David A. Malueg, 2020. "Preemption contests between groups," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 934-961, September.
  14. Christopher J. Ellis & Thomas Groll, 2018. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interests and Hired Guns," CESifo Working Paper Series 7367, CESifo.
  15. repec:osf:socarx:8z4ax_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Christian Cox, 2023. "Lobbying for government appropriations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(3), pages 443-483, September.
  17. Dellis, Arnaud, 2023. "Legislative informational lobbying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
  18. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
  19. Priyanka Joshi, 2026. "Lobbying: influence under micro-targeting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 66(1), pages 27-72, February.
  20. Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie & Scervini, Francesco, 2020. "Strategic Compromise, Policy Bundling and Interest Group Power," IZA Discussion Papers 13924, IZA Network @ LISER.
  21. repec:osf:socarx:8z4ax_v3 is not listed on IDEAS
  22. Cotton, Christopher, 2015. "Competing for Attention," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 274670, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
  23. Li, Cheng & Xiao, Yancheng, 2020. "Persuasion, Spillovers, and Government Interventions," MPRA Paper 103500, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  24. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Subpoena Power and Information Transmission," Adelaide Economics Working Papers 2017-05, Adelaide University, School of Economics.
  25. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Overlobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint," Adelaide Economics Working Papers 2016-05, Adelaide University, School of Economics.
  26. Ravi Radhakrishnan, 2022. "Public expenditure allocation, lobbying, and growth," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(4), pages 756-780, August.
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