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Ambiguous Persuasion

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:

  1. Matthew Kovach, 2024. "Ambiguity and partial Bayesian updating," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(1), pages 155-180, August.
  2. Evsyukova, Yulia & Innocenti, Federico & Lomys, Niccolò, 2024. "Information design with frame choice," ZEW Discussion Papers 24-084, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  3. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Dominik Karos & Toygar T. Kerman, 2024. "Belief inducibility and informativeness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(4), pages 517-553, June.
  4. Pahlke, Marieke, 2019. "A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 611, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  5. Sarah Auster & Christian Kellner, 2023. "Timing Decisions Under Model Uncertainty," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_460, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  6. Takashi Ui, 2023. "Strategic Ambiguity in Global Games," Papers 2303.12263, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
  7. Alon, Shiri & Auster, Sarah & Gayer, Gabi & Minardi, Stefania, 2023. "Persuasion with Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 18428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Spyros Galanis & Christos A. Ioannou & Stelios Kotronis, 2023. "Supplementary appendix to Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Department of Economics Working Papers 2023_05, Durham University, Department of Economics.
  9. Pahlke, Marieke, 2022. "Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 85-108.
  10. Ui, Takashi, 2025. "Strategic ambiguity in global games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 65-81.
  11. Denis Shishkin & Pietro Ortoleva, 2021. "Ambiguous Information and Dilation: An Experiment," Working Papers 2020-53, Princeton University. Economics Department..
  12. Burkovskaya, Anastasia & Li, Jian, 2020. "Comparative Profitability of Product Disclosure Statements," Working Papers 2020-01, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
  13. Xiaoyu Cheng, 2019. "Relative Maximum Likelihood Updating of Ambiguous Beliefs," Papers 1911.02678, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
  14. Wang, Zichang, 2024. "Informativeness orders over ambiguous experiments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
  15. Shishkin, Denis & Ortoleva, Pietro, 2023. "Ambiguous information and dilation: An experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
  16. Xiaoyu Cheng, 2020. "Ambiguous Persuasion: An Ex-Ante Formulation," Papers 2010.05376, arXiv.org, revised May 2025.
  17. Sarah Auster & Christian Kellner, 2023. "Timing Decisions under Model Uncertainty," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 252, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  18. Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler, 2021. "Persuasion with Ambiguous Receiver Preferences," Papers 2109.11536, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  19. Spyros Galanis & Christos A Ioannou & Stelios Kotronis, 2024. "Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(6), pages 3423-3467.
  20. Longjian Li, 2022. "Ambiguous Cheap Talk," Papers 2209.08494, arXiv.org.
  21. Jonas Hedlund & T. Florian Kauffeldt & Malte Lammert, 2021. "Persuasion under ambiguity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 455-482, May.
  22. Zhiwei Liu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2021. "Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald’s maxmin preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 801-833, October.
  23. repec:mcm:deptwp:2024-02 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T. & Riener, Gerhard, 2022. "Reacting to ambiguous messages: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 360-378.
  25. Pietro Dall'Ara, 2024. "Persuading an inattentive and privately informed receiver," Papers 2408.01250, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
  26. Grant, Simon & Stauber, Ronald, 2022. "Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 487-509.
  27. Paul Duetting & Michal Feldman & Yarden Rashti, 2025. "Succinct Ambiguous Contracts," Papers 2503.02592, arXiv.org.
  28. repec:upd:utmpwp:032 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Cheng, Xiaoyu, 2022. "Relative Maximum Likelihood updating of ambiguous beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
  30. Pahlke, Marieke, 2022. "Dynamic Consistency and Ambiguous Communication," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264027, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  31. Auster, Sarah & Kellner, Christian, 2022. "Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
  32. Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
  33. Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex, 2022. "Cheap talk with private signal structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 288-304.
  34. Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.
  35. Rui Tang, 2020. "A Theory of Updating Ambiguous Information," Papers 2012.13650, arXiv.org.
  36. Nikzad, Afshin, 2021. "Persuading a pessimist: Simplicity and robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 144-157.
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