Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Navin Kartik & Andreas Kleiner & Richard Van Weelden, 2021.
"Delegation in Veto Bargaining,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(12), pages 4046-4087, December.
- Navin Kartik & Andreas Kleiner & Richard Van Weelden, 2020. "Delegation in Veto Bargaining," Papers 2006.06773, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
- Halac, Marina & Yared, Pierre, 2018.
"Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
12872, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2018. "Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules," NBER Working Papers 24496, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi, 2021.
"Relational communication,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
- Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2018. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2020. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12b, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2019. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12a, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi Li, 2019. "Relational Communication," Papers 1901.05645, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
- Amador, Manuel & Bagwell, Kyle, 2020. "Money burning in the theory of delegation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 382-412.
- Laureti, Carolina & Szafarz, Ariane, 2023.
"Banking regulation and costless commitment contracts for time-inconsistent agents,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
- Carolina Laureti & Ariane Szafarz, 2023. "Banking Regulation and Costless Commitment Contracts for Time-Inconsistent Agents," Working Papers CEB 23-010, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Raghul S Venkatesh, 2018. "Communication and Commitment with Constraints," AMSE Working Papers 1856, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jul 2019.
- Maxim Senkov & Toygar T. Kerman, 2024.
"Changing Simplistic Worldviews,"
Papers
2401.02867, arXiv.org.
- Maxim Senkov & Toygar T. Kerman, 2024. "Changing Simplistic Worldviews," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp773, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2022. "Wasteful procedures?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
- Mehdi Ayouni & Franck Bien & Thomas Lanzi, 2022. "The failure of the delegation principle in a principal-agent model with transfers," Working Papers of BETA 2022-14, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Alex Frankel, 2021. "Selecting Applicants," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(2), pages 615-645, March.
- Galperti, Simone, 2019. "A theory of personal budgeting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
- Maxim Senkov & Toygar T. Kerman, 2025. "Persuasion with simplistic worldviews," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 99(3), pages 677-700, November.
- Noam Tanner, 2018. "Optimal Delegation Under Unknown Bias: The Role of Concavity," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers RPA 18-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2022.
"Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Limited Enforcement,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2093-2127, September.
- Halac, Marina & Yared, Pierre, 2019. "Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Limited Enforcement," CEPR Discussion Papers 14218, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2019. "Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Limited Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 25463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021.
"Resisting persuasion,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 723-742, October.
- Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Resisting Persuasion," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 07-2017, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Raghul S. Venkatesh, 2025. "Commitment contracts with action constraints," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(4), pages 675-715, December.
- Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2020.
"Repeated delegation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
- Elliot Lipnowski & Joao Ramos, 2015. "Repeated Delegation," Working Papers 15-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Elliot Lipnowski & Joao Ramos, 2018. "Repeated Delegation," 2018 Meeting Papers 1292, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Raghul S Venkatesh, 2019. "Communication and Commitment with Constraints in International Alliances," Working Papers halshs-01962239, HAL.
- Andreas Kleiner, 2022. "Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World," Papers 2208.11835, arXiv.org.
- Mehdi Ayouni & Franck Bien & Thomas Lanzi, 2023. "The failure of the delegation principle in a principal-agent model with transfers," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 43(1), pages 518-525.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic & Jennifer Soto, 2019. "Financing PPP Projects with PVR Contracts: Theory and Evidence from the UK and Chile," Documentos de Trabajo 347, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Juan Escobar & Qiaoxi Zhang, 2019. "Delegating Learning," Documentos de Trabajo 348, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2020. "Screening for breakthroughs," Papers 2011.10090, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2025.
- Saran, Rene, 2026. "A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 27-54.
- Manuel Amador & Kyle Bagwell & Alex Frankel, 2018. "A note on interval delegation," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(2), pages 239-249, October.
- Ball, Ian & Gao, Xin, 2024. "Benefiting from bias: Delegating to encourage information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/jetheo/v171y2017icp101-135.html