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Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Maor Ben Zaquen & Ron Holzman, 2026. "The Domain of RSD Characterization by Efficiency, Symmetry, and Strategy-Proofness," Papers 2602.01224, arXiv.org.
  2. Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian, 2022. "The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 168-187.
  3. Juan Pereyra & Tom Demeulemeester, 2024. "Rawlsian Assignments," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 2403, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
  4. Liu, Peng & Zeng, Huaxia, 2019. "Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 176-194.
  5. Yajing Chen & Patrick Harless & Zhenhua Jiao, 2024. "The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(1), pages 21-43, February.
  6. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars, 2024. "On (constrained) Efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment," VfS Annual Conference 2024 (Berlin): Upcoming Labor Market Challenges 302429, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  7. Anna Bogomolnaia, 2024. "On slots’ scheduling," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 77(3), pages 653-674, May.
  8. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2022. "Constrained random matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  9. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  10. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars H., 2022. "Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2022-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  11. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 168-177.
  12. Yang, Shanhui, 2024. "Characterizing a probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism under weak priorities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 244(C).
  13. Christian Basteck & Lars Ehlers, 2025. "On (Constrained) Efficiency of Strategy‐Proof Random Assignment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(2), pages 569-595, March.
  14. Ping Zhan, 2023. "A Simple Characterization of Assignment Mechanisms on Set Constraints," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 1-15, June.
  15. Huang, Chao & Tian, Guoqiang, 2017. "Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 1-8.
  16. Harless, Patrick, 2019. "Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 107-116.
  17. José Alcalde & José Ángel Silva-Reus, 2013. "Allocating via Priorities," QM&ET Working Papers 13-3, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
  18. Tom Demeulemeester & Juan S. Pereyra, 2022. "Rawlsian Assignments," Papers 2207.02930, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
  19. Yoshio Sano & Ping Zhan, 2021. "Extended Random Assignment Mechanisms on a Family of Good Sets," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 1-30, December.
  20. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars H., 2023. "On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2023-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  21. Chang, Hee-In & Chun, Youngsub, 2017. "Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 80-92.
  22. Yajing Chen & Patrick Harless & Zhenhua Jiao, 2021. "The probabilistic rank random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization," Papers 2104.09165, arXiv.org.
  23. Wonki Jo Cho, 2018. "Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 137-162, June.
  24. Conal Duddy, 2025. "Egalitarian random assignment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 80(1), pages 321-354, August.
  25. Jugal Garg & Yixin Tao & L'aszl'o A. V'egh, 2025. "Tight Efficiency Bounds for the Probabilistic Serial and Related Mechanisms," Papers 2507.03359, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
  26. Cho, Wonki Jo & Doğan, Battal, 2016. "Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 8-12.
  27. Andrew McLennan & Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura, 2024. "An Efficient, Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanism," Discussion Papers Series 668, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  28. Chen, Yajing & Jiao, Zhenhua & Zhao, Fang, 2025. "The equivalence between random priority and probabilistic serial rule on restricted preference domains," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 251(C).
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