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Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0030, Berlin School of Economics.
  2. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  3. Elchanan Ben‐Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2019. "Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(2), pages 529-566, March.
  4. Jehiel, Philippe, 2021. "Communication with forgetful liars," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(2), May.
  5. Arjada Bardhi, 2024. "Attributes: Selective Learning and Influence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(2), pages 311-353, March.
  6. Curello, Gregorio & Sinander, Ludvig, 2025. "Screening for breakthroughs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 20(4), November.
  7. Goel, Sumit & Hann-Caruthers, Wade, 2024. "Project selection with partially verifiable information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 105-113.
  8. ,, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  9. Koessler, Frédéric & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2021. "Information Design by an Informed Designer," CEPR Discussion Papers 15709, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  10. Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence reading mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 375-397, October.
  11. Ayça Özdoðan, 2016. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21.
  12. Emir Kamenica & Xiao Lin, 2024. "Commitment and Randomization in Communication," Papers 2410.17503, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
  13. Chen, Ying & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Effective persuasion," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1310, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  14. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(3), pages 163-175, September.
  16. repec:ehu:dfaeii:8770 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2013. "Regulatory Capture by Sophistication," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79991, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  18. Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2023. "Informed Information Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(11), pages 3186-3232.
  19. Titova, Maria & Zhang, Kun, 2025. "Persuasion with verifiable information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 230(C).
  20. Sergiu Hart & Ilan Kremer & Motty Perry, 2017. "Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(3), pages 690-713, March.
  21. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2014. "Social Accountability: Persuasion and Debate to Contain Corruption," Working Papers halshs-00922092, HAL.
  22. Mehdi Ayouni & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(3), pages 327-339, March.
  23. Rappoport, Daniel, 2025. "Evidence and skepticism in verifiable disclosure games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 20(4), November.
  24. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2024. "Screening for Breakthroughs," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_562, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  25. Lichtig, Avi & Weksler, Ran, 2023. "Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
  26. Nika Haghtalab & Nicole Immorlica & Brendan Lucier & Markus Mobius & Divyarthi Mohan, 2022. "Communicating with Anecdotes," Papers 2205.13461, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
  27. Shaofei Jiang, 2024. "Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(1), pages 43-70, March.
  28. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2019. "Strategic communication with reporting costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 341-363, October.
  29. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2020. "Screening for breakthroughs," Papers 2011.10090, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2025.
  30. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
  31. Ying Chen & Wojciech Olszewski, 2014. "Effective Persuasion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(2), pages 319-347, May.
  32. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2014. "Social Accountability: Persuasion and Debate to Contain Corruption," PSE Working Papers halshs-00922092, HAL.
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