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Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals
Citations
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Cited by:
- Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2021. "A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Analysis in Competing Mechanism Games," Department of Economics Working Papers 2021-09, McMaster University.
- Han, Seungjin, 2014.
"Implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 85-95.
- Han, Seungjin, 2011. "Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection," Microeconomics.ca working papers seungjin_han-2011-10, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 02 Apr 2013.
- Seungjin Han, 2012. "Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-15, McMaster University, revised Apr 2013.
- Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps, 2019.
"Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(4), pages 977-990, June.
- Attar, Andrea & Casamatta, Catherine & Chassagnon, Arnold & Décamps, Jean-Paul, 2017. "Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: the Role of Menus," TSE Working Papers 17-821, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps, 2019. "Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus," Post-Print halshs-02281995, HAL.
- Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps, 2019. "Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02281995, HAL.
- John Bennett & Matthew D. Rablen, 2021.
"Bribery, hold‐up, and bureaucratic structure,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 880-903, July.
- John Bennett & Matthew D. Rablen, 2018. "Bribery, Hold-Up and Bureaucratic Structure," Working Papers 2018011, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics.
- Bennett, John & Rablen, Matthew D., 2018. "Bribery, Hold-Up and Bureaucratic Structure," IZA Discussion Papers 11593, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
- Krasteva, Silvana & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2012. "On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 714-730.
- Rivera Mora, Ernesto, 2024. "Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
- Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2023.
"Slow persuasion,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
- Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "Slow persuasion," Papers 1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
- Salvatore Piccolo & Giovanni W. Puopolo & Luis Vasconcelos, 2016.
"Non-Exclusive Financial Advice,"
Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 20(6), pages 2079-2123.
- Salvatore Piccolo & Giovanni W. Puopolo & Luis Vasconcelos, 2013. "Non-Exclusive Financial Advice," CSEF Working Papers 347, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 13 Oct 2015.
- Seungjin Han, 2020. "Quasi Ex-Post Equilibrium in Competing Mechanisms," Department of Economics Working Papers 2020-11, McMaster University.
- V. Bhaskar & Nikita Roketskiy, 2021.
"Consumer privacy and serial monopoly,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 917-944, December.
- Roketskiy, Nikita & Bhaskar, Venkataraman, 2019. "Consumer Privacy and Serial Monopoly," CEPR Discussion Papers 13686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- V. Bhaskar & Nikita Roketskiy, 2019. "Consumer Privacy and Serial Monopoly," Papers 1904.07644, arXiv.org.
- Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Pavan, Alessandro, 2021. "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle," TSE Working Papers 21-1227, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2025.
- Michael Peters, 2014. "Competing mechanisms," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(2), pages 373-397, May.
- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan, 2021.
"Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms,"
CEIS Research Paper
519, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 21 Oct 2021.
- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan, 2023. "Keeping the agents in the dark : private disclosures in competing mechanisms," Working Papers hal-03266804, HAL.
- Mariotti, Thomas & Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Pavan, Alessandro, 2021. "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 16807, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Calzolari, Giacomo & Pavan, Alessandro, 2008.
"On the use of menus in sequential common agency,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 329-334, September.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2008. "On the Use of Menus in Sequential Common Agency," Discussion Papers 1498, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Alessandro Acquisti & Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2016. "The Economics of Privacy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(2), pages 442-492, June.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Carlo Scarpa, 2016. "Conglomerates And Regulation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1648-1669, July.
- Susumu Cato & Akifumi Ishihara, 2017. "Transparency and Performance Evaluation in Sequential Agency," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(3), pages 475-506.
- Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps, 2017. "On the Role of Menus in Sequential Contracting: a Multiple Lending Example," CEIS Research Paper 409, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 13 Jul 2017.
- Ghosh, Sambuddha & Han, Seungjin, 2012.
"Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets,"
Microeconomics.ca working papers
seungjin_han-2012-12, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 02 May 2013.
- Sambuddha Ghosh & Seungjin Han, 2012. "Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-03, McMaster University, revised May 2013.
- Peters, Michael, 2015. "Reciprocal contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 102-126.
- Thomas A. Gresik & Kai A. Konrad, 2017. "Tax Havens, Accounting Experts, and Fee-Setting Rules," CESifo Working Paper Series 6774, CESifo.
- Peck, James, 2018. "Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 126-161.
- Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "Sequential Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
- Piotr Dworczak, 2020. "Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2629-2661, November.
- Peters, Michael, 2014. "Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2014-7, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.