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Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022-05, McMaster University.
  2. Aram Grigoryan & Markus Moller, 2024. "Robust Market Design with Opaque Announcements," Papers 2408.04509, arXiv.org.
  3. Aram Grigoryan & Markus Möller, 2025. "Robust Market Design with Opaque Announcements," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_653, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  4. Abeler, Johannes & Huffman, David B. & Raymond, Collin, 2023. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision," IZA Discussion Papers 16284, IZA Network @ LISER.
  5. Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2025. "Calibrated Mechanism Design," Papers 2512.17858, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
  6. Beccuti, Juan & Möller, Marc, 2021. "Screening by mode of trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 400-420.
  7. Maryam Saeedi & Ali Shourideh, 2020. "Optimal Rating Design under Moral Hazard," Papers 2008.09529, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2026.
  8. Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2024. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
  9. Rivera Mora, Ernesto, 2024. "Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
  10. Tangerås, Thomas & Gick, Wolfgang, 2021. "Contracting with Endogenously Incomplete Commitment: Escape Clauses," Working Paper Series 1390, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  11. Emir Kamenica & Xiao Lin, 2024. "Commitment and Randomization in Communication," PIER Working Paper Archive 24-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  12. Juan Beccuti, 2020. "On the Optimality of Price-posting in Rental Markets," Diskussionsschriften dp2007, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  13. Georgy Lukyanov & Samuel Safaryan, 2025. "Public Persuasion with Endogenous Fact-Checking," Papers 2508.19682, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
  14. Skreta, Vasiliki & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Purchase history and product personalization," CEPR Discussion Papers 15969, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  15. Liu, Yi & Wu, Fan, 2024. "Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
  16. Liu, Qingmin & Mierendorff, Konrad & Shi, Xianwen, 2025. "Coasian equilibria in sequential auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
  17. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  18. Johannes Abeler & David Huffman & Collin Raymond, 2025. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality, and Effort Provision," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 115(12), pages 4404-4437, December.
  19. Yi Liu & Yang Yu, 2024. "Money Burning Improves Mediated Communication," Papers 2411.19431, arXiv.org.
  20. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Constrained Information Design," Papers 1811.03588, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
  21. Andrea Attar & Lorenzo Bozzoli & Roland Strausz, 2026. "Self-Revealing Renegotiation," Working Papers hal-05506686, HAL.
  22. Jiadong Gu, 2024. "Data Trade and Consumer Privacy," Papers 2406.12457, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2026.
  23. Breig, Zachary, 2022. "Repeated contracting without commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  24. Lukyanov, Georgy & Safaryan, Samuel, 2026. "Public Persuasion with Endogenous Fact-Checking," TSE Working Papers 26-1714, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  25. Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2024. "Mechanism design with limited commitment: Markov environments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
  26. Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2024. "Persuasion and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(7), pages 2451-2487.
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