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Director interlocks and executive turnover in German public corporations: A hazard analysis for the period from 1996 to 2008

Listed author(s):
  • Balsmeier, Benjamin
  • Buchwald, Achim
  • Dilger, Alexander
  • Lingens, Jörg

Wir untersuchen das Ausscheiden von Vorstandsmitgliedern, insbesondere hinsichtlich verschiedener Arten von weiteren Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratsmandaten der Aufsichtsratsmitglieder. Es werden alle Vorstandsmitglieder der größten deutschen Aktiengesellschaften im Zeitraum 1996 bis 2008 analysiert. Schätzungen von proportionalen Hazard-Raten gemäß Cox legen nahe, dass Aktiengesellschaften ihre eigenen Vorstandsmitglieder in fremde Aufsichtsräte schicken, um ihre Kapitalanteile aktiv zu managen und zu überwachen. Externe Vorstandsmitglieder im Aufsichtsrat, die keine Kapitalanteile repräsentieren, erhöhen nur die Aufsicht über Vorstandsvorsitzende. Die Zahl weiterer externer Aufsichtsratsmandate aller Vertreter der Kapitalseite scheint die Corporate Governance zu verbessern, was auf einen funktionierenden Markt für knappe Talente als Aufsichtsrat hindeutet.

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Paper provided by University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics in its series Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics with number 6/2011.

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Date of creation: 2011
Handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:62011
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