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Ein Ansatz zur experimentellen Überprüfung der ökonomischen Theorie des Haftungsrechts


  • Berlemann, Michael


Die Ökonomische Theorie des Haftungsrechts kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daß Haftungsregeln unter bestimmten Bedingungen dazu geeignet sind, externe Effekte zu internalisieren. Die allokativen Wirkungen von verschiedenen Haftungsregeln wurden in Deutschland insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund der Verabschiedung des Umwelthaftungsgesetzes (UHG) Ende 1990 oder der Regelung der gentechnologischen Forschung stark diskutiert. Es wird aufgezeigt, daß eine experimentelle Untersuchung der Ökonomischen Theorie des Haftungsrechts wünschenswert ist. Wie eine solche experimentelle Untersuchung aussehen könnte, wird anhand einer hierfür entwickelten Software erläutert.

Suggested Citation

  • Berlemann, Michael, 1997. "Ein Ansatz zur experimentellen Überprüfung der ökonomischen Theorie des Haftungsrechts," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 03/97, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuddps:0397

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Friedman,Daniel & Sunder,Shyam, 1994. "Experimental Methods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521456821.
    2. Andreoni, James, 1995. "Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 891-904, September.
    3. Siebert, Horst, 1987. "Haftung ex post versus Anreize ex ante: Einige Gedanken zur Umweltpolitik bei Unsicherheit," Discussion Papers, Series II 34, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    4. Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
    5. Estrada, Javier, 1993. "A note on the optimality of strict liability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 187-191.
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