IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/rwirep/412.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

How to Improve Patient Care? – An Analysis of Capitation, Fee-for-Service, and Mixed Payment Schemes for Physicians

Author

Listed:
  • Brosig-Koch, Jeannette
  • Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
  • Kairies, Nadja
  • Wiesen, Daniel

Abstract

In recent health care reforms, several countries have replaced pure payment schemes for physicians (fee-for-service, capitation) by so-called mixed payment schemes. Until now it is still an unresolved issue whether patients are really better off after these reforms. In this study we compare the effects resulting from pure and mixed incentives for physicians under controlled laboratory conditions. Subjects in the role of physicians choose the quantity of medical services for different patient types. Real patients gain a monetary benefit from subjects' decisions. Our results reveal that overprovision observed in fee-for-service schemes and underprovision observed in capitation schemes can, in fact, be reduced by mixed incentives. Interestingly, even the presentation of pure incentives as mixed incentives already significantly affects physicians' behavior. Moreover, the mixed payment schemes generally provide a higher benefit-remuneration ratio than the respective pure payment schemes. Our findings provide some valuable insights for designing health care reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Brosig-Koch, Jeannette & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike & Kairies, Nadja & Wiesen, Daniel, 2013. "How to Improve Patient Care? – An Analysis of Capitation, Fee-for-Service, and Mixed Payment Schemes for Physicians," Ruhr Economic Papers 412, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:412
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/73680/1/746042639.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kesternich, Iris & Schumacher, Heiner & Winter, Joachim, 2015. "Professional norms and physician behavior: Homo oeconomicus or homo hippocraticus?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 1-11.
    2. Huck, Steffen & Lünser, Gabriele & Spitzer, Florian & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2016. "Medical insurance and free choice of physician shape patient overtreatment: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PB), pages 78-105.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    physician incentive schemes; fee-for-service; capitation; mixed payment; laboratory experiment; presentation effect; benefit-remuneration analysis;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:412. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/rwiesde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.