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The Composition of the College of Commissioners: Patterns of Delegation

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  • Döring, Holger

Abstract

Recent theoretical studies question the view that the European Commission is a preference outlier. This paper addresses this question by discussing the composition of the European College of Commissioners and by focusing on the appointment process. The analysis is based on a dataset that contains biographical information for all commissioners since 1958. The analysis highlights the importance of commissioners? party affi liation and their former political positions. Multivariate regression analysis shows that smaller member states have tended to send more high-ranking politicians to the College of Commissioners than larger member states. However, party affi liation has not become more important as an appointment criterion. What has changed with time has not been the party link but the caliber of positions held by commissioners before they are appointed to the College.

Suggested Citation

  • Döring, Holger, 2006. "The Composition of the College of Commissioners: Patterns of Delegation," MPIfG Discussion Paper 06/4, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:p0072
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/19932/1/dp06-4.pdf
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    1. Abdul Ghafar Noury & Simon Hix & Gérard Roland, 2005. "Power to parties: cohesion and competition in the European Parliament 1979-2001," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7752, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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