IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Defending organized crime? A note


  • Backhaus, Jürgen G.


The objective of this to discuss optimal enforcement strategies vis-a-vis organized and unorganized crime. Taking an earlier contribution by Buchanan as a starting point of the analysis, it is argued that his proposal to monopolize crime in order to reduce the general level of criminal activity is a questionable strategy to curb crime. Syndicated crime is likely to benefit from economies of scale in the provision of non-governmental enforcement of agreements and contracts. The consequent reduction in costs is likely to increase the general level of criminal activity. Nevertheless, the price-theoretic argument is seen as an interesting starting point for the design of new strategies to combat crime.

Suggested Citation

  • Backhaus, Jürgen G., 1979. "Defending organized crime? A note," Discussion Papers, Series I 120, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp1:120

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110-110.
    2. Scott Gordon, 1968. "The Close of the Galbraithian System," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 635-635.
    3. Brozen, Yale, 1970. "The Antitrust Task Force Deconcentration Recommendation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 279-292, October.
    4. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 351-351.
    5. Lester G. Telser, 1964. "Advertising and Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72, pages 537-537.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Acconcia & Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo & Patrick Rey, 2014. "Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 116(4), pages 1116-1159, October.
    2. Antony W. Dnes & Nuno Garoupa, 2010. "Behavior, Human Capital and the Formation of Gangs," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 517-529, November.
    3. Garoupa, Nuno, 2007. "Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 461-474, July.
    4. Salvatore Piccolo & Giovanni Immordino, 2012. "Optimal Accomplice-Witnesses Regulation under Asymmetric Information," CSEF Working Papers 304, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    5. Dick, Andrew R., 1995. "When does organized crime pay? A transaction cost analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 25-45, January.
    6. Aquilante, Tommaso & Maretto, Guido, 2016. "Cooperation in Criminal Markets," MPRA Paper 75949, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp1:120. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.