Does majority voting improve board accountability?
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- Lin, Yu-Hsin & Chang, Yun-chien, 2017. "Does mandating cumulative voting weaken controlling shareholders? A difference-in-differences approach," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 111-123.
- Schoenfeld, Jordan, 2017. "The effect of voluntary disclosure on stock liquidity: New evidence from index funds," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 51-74.
- Dressler, Efrat, 2020. "Voice and power: Do institutional shareholders make use of their voting power?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
- Oded Cohen, 2020. "Measuring Corporate Governance Quality in Concentrated-Ownership Firms," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2020.06, Bank of Israel.
- Chen, Naiwei & Yu, Min-Teh, 2021. "National Governance and Corporate Liquidity in Organization of Islamic Cooperation Countries: Evidence based on a Sharia-compliant Liquidity Measure," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
- Chung, Kee H. & Lee, Choonsik, 2020. "Voting methods for director election, monitoring costs, and institutional ownership," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
- Arjun Mitra & Corinne Post & Steve Sauerwald, 2021. "Evaluating Board Candidates: A Threat-Contingency Model of Shareholder Dissent Against Female Director Candidates," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(1), pages 86-110, January.
- Ashraf, Rasha & Li, Huimin & Ryan, Harley E., 2020. "Dual agency problems in family firms: Evidence from director elections," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
- Matsusaka, John G. & Ozbas, Oguzhan & Yi, Irene, 2017. "Why Do Managers Fight Shareholder Proposals? Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter Decisions," Working Papers 262, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2016-11-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2016-11-20 (Positive Political Economics)
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