Persuasion by stress testing: Optimal disclosure of supervisory information in the banking sector
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- Maria Rosa Borges & José Zorro Mendes & André Pereira, 2019. "The Value of Information: The Impact of European Union Bank Stress Tests on Stock Markets," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 25(4), pages 429-444, November.
- Ludmila Matyskova, 2018. "Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Information Acquisition," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp614, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Paul Glasserman & Chulmin Kang & Wanmo Kang, 2013. "Stress Scenario Selection by Empirical Likelihood," Working Papers 13-07, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
- Rick Bookstaber & Jill Cetina & Greg Feldberg & Mark Flood & Paul Glasserman, 2013. "Stress Tests to Promote Financial Stability: Assessing Progress and Looking to the Future," Working Papers 13-10, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
- Horváth, Roman & Vaško, Dan, 2016. "Central bank transparency and financial stability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 45-56.
- Georgescu, Oana-Maria & Gross, Marco & Kapp, Daniel & Kok, Christoffer, 2017. "Do stress tests matter? Evidence from the 2014 and 2016 stress tests," Working Paper Series 2054, European Central Bank.
- Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2014. "Costly Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 457-462, May.
More about this item
KeywordsStress Tests; Supervisory Information; Bayesian Persuasion; Multiple Receivers; Disclosure;
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-BAN-2012-12-22 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2012-12-22 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2012-12-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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