Are Unmanaged Earnings Always Better for Shareholders?
The push for increased transparency in financial reporting and corporate governance serves shareholders only up to a limit. The problem of assessing the value of transparency to shareholders is subtle because both the level and pattern of earnings can convey information. Even when earnings management conceals information, it can be beneficial to shareholders. Distinguishing between ex ante and ex post efficiency underscores the advantages of achieving a balance between transparency and privacy in corporations.
|Date of creation:||01 Nov 2002|
|Date of revision:||01 Feb 2003|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://icf.som.yale.edu/|
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- Arya, A. & Glover, J., 1999. "Aggregate Performance Measures as a Response to One-Side Error Correction," GSIA Working Papers 1999-21, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Jonathan C. Glover & Anil Arya & Shyam NMI Sunder, 1999. "Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm120, Yale School of Management.
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