Policy Decentralisation and Exchange Rate Management in Interdependent Economies
The demise of Bretton Woods and of the short-lived Smithsonian agreement has raised questions about exchange rate management by monetary authorities acting in isolation from one another. For instance, will individual monetary authorities have an incentive to stabilise the exchange rate? To what extent will monetary actions abroad disrupt domestic monetary policy? What are the gains from co-ordinating monetary policy? The problems that arise when different agents pursue independent policies in interdependent economies have been explored by a number of authors. Aoki (1976), Cooper (1969), Hamada (1976), Allen and Kenen (1980), McFadden (1967), Patrick (1973), Kydland (1976) and Pindyck (1976), among others, have made significant contributions. Different authors have focused on different aspects of decentralized policy formation. One purpose of this paper is to provide a general discussion of decentralization. A second purpose of this paper is to analyse the optimal design of monetary policy in interdependent economies
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1980|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +44 (0) 2476 523202
Fax: +44 (0) 2476 523032
Web page: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
- Robert S. Pindyck, 1976. "The Cost of Conflicting Objectives in Policy Formulation," NBER Chapters, in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 5, number 2, pages 239-248 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- William Poole, 1969.
"Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple stochastic macro model,"
Special Studies Papers
2, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Poole, William, 1970. "Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 197-216, May.
- William Poole, 1970. "Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple stochastic macro model," Staff Studies 57, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Taylor, John B, 1977. "Conditions for Unique Solutions in Stochastic Macroeconomic Models with Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(6), pages 1377-85, September.
- Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1979.
"Rational destabilizing speculation and exchange intervention policy,"
International Finance Discussion Papers
157, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Canzoneri, Matthew B., 1983. "Rational destabilizing speculation and exchange intervention policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 75-90.
- Barro, Robert J, 1978. "A Stochastic Equilibrium Model of an Open Economy under Flexible Exchange Rates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(1), pages 149-64, February.
- Robert A. Mundell, 1962. "The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal and External Stability," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 9(1), pages 70-79, March.
- Harris, Richard G & Purvis, Douglas D, 1981.
"Diverse Information and Market Efficiency in a Monetary Model of the Exchange Rate,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(364), pages 829-47, December.
- Richard G. Harris & Douglas D. Purvis, 1978. "Diverse Information and Market Efficiency in a Monetary Model of the Exchange Rate," Working Papers 309, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1975. ""Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 241-54, April.
- Cooper, Richard N, 1969. "Macroeconomic Policy Adjustment in Interdependent Economies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 83(1), pages 1-24, February.
- Woglom, Geoffrey, 1979. "Rational Expectations and Monetary Policy in a Simple Macroeconomic Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(1), pages 91-105, February.
- Aoki, Masanao, 1976. "On decentralized stabilization policies and dynamic assignment problems," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 143-171, May.
- Don E. Roper & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 1980. "Optimal Exchange Market Intervention in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(2), pages 296-309, May.
- Patrick, John D., 1973. "Establishing convergent decentralized policy assignment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 37-51, February.
- Turnovsky, Stephen J, 1980. "The Choice of Monetary Instrument under Alternative Forms of Price Expectations," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 48(1), pages 39-62, March.
- Weiss, Laurence, 1982.
"Information Aggregation and Policy,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 31-42, January.
- Hamada, Koichi, 1976. "A Strategic Analysis of Monetary Interdependence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(4), pages 677-700, August.
- McCallum, B. T. & Whitaker, J. K., 1979. "The effectiveness of fiscal feedback rules and automatic stabilizers under rational expectations," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 171-186, April.
- Boyer, Russell S, 1978. "Optimal Foreign Exchange Market Intervention," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(6), pages 1045-55, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:172. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Helen Neal)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.