Equilibrium and the Core in Alonso's Discrete Population Model of Land Use
Conventional wisdom tells us that with no market failure and local non- satiation of preferences, the core is at least as large as the collection of competitive equilibrium allocations. We confirm this for a standard model featuring land. Next we consider the public land ownership version of the model. If the role of land ownership and rent distribution is assumed by a government that ploughs back rent (at least in excess of its agricultural value) to its citizens, the equilibrium remains efficient, but no longer need be in the core.
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- Fujita,Masahisa, 1991.
"Urban Economic Theory,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521396455, December.
- Berliant, M. & Fujita, M., 1990.
"Alonso'S Discrete Population Model Of Land Use: Efficient Allocations And Competitive Equilibria,"
RCER Working Papers
217, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Berliant, Marcus & Fujita, Masahisa, 1992. "Alonso's Discrete Population Model of Land Use: Efficient Allocations and Competitive Equilibria," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(3), pages 535-566, August.
- Berliant, Marcus & Papageorgiou, Yorgos Y. & Wang, Ping, 1990. "On welfare theory and urban economics," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 245-261, September.
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