A Simple Model of Informative Advertising
This paper presents an oligopolistic model of informative advertising, where firms simultaneously choose prices and advertising intensities. For this game there is a dispersed price equilibrium in which the amount of advertising by each firm is socially optimal. The advertising technology considered is more general than in Butters, however his results can be obtained as the number of firms tends to infinity. For some advertising technologies entry leads to a market contraction; we can also observe situations where increases in advertising costs lead to higher profits. This model can be used as a "benchmark" against which other models of informative advertising can be compared.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, 1977. "Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 493-510.
- Rothschild, Michael, 1973. "Models of Market Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(6), pages 1283-1308, Nov.-Dec..
- Louis L. Wilde & Alan Schwartz, 1979. "Equilibrium Comparison Shopping," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 543-553.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:9508003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.