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Metabolism of Social System: N-Person Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Analysis In Random Boolean Network


  • Hokky Situngkir

    (Bandung Fe Institute)

  • Deni Khanafiah

    (Bandung Fe Institute)


Random Boolean Network has been used to find out regulation patterns of genes in organism. This approach is very interesting to use in a game such as N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma. Here we assume that agent’s action is influenced by input in the form of choices of cooperate or defect she accepted from other agent or group of agents in the system. Number of cooperators, pay-off value received by each agent, and average value of the group, are observed in every state, from initial state chosen until it reaches its state-cycle attractor. In simulation performed here, we gain information that a system with large number agents based on action on input K equals to two, will reach equilibrium and stable condition over strategies taken out by its agents faster than higher input, that is K equals to three. Equilibrium reached in longer interval, yet it is stable over strategies carried out by agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Hokky Situngkir & Deni Khanafiah, 2004. "Metabolism of Social System: N-Person Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Analysis In Random Boolean Network," Game Theory and Information 0405002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0405002
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Frank Schweitzer & Laxmidhar Behera & Heinz Mühlenbein, 2002. "Evolution Of Cooperation In A Spatial Prisoner'S Dilemma," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(02n03), pages 269-299.
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    More about this item


    evolutionary game theory; N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma; cooperation; social stability; Random Boolean Network; Transition Rule;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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