Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers
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Other versions of this item:
- Paolo Laureti & Frantisek Slanina & Yi-Kuo Yu & Yi-Cheng Zhang, 2002. "Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers," Papers physics/0207020, arXiv.org.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gabuthy, Yannick & Jacquemet, Nicolas & Marchand, Nadège, 2008.
"Does resorting to online dispute resolution promote agreements? Experimental evidence,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 259-282, February.
- Yannick Gabuthy & Nadège Marchand, 2003. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00178587, HAL.
- Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet & Nadège Marchand, 2008. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00259453, HAL.
- Yannick Gabuthy & Nadège Marchand, 2004. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence," Experimental 0402002, EconWPA.
- Yannick Gabuthy & Nadège Marchand, 2004. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0401, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Laureti, Paolo & Moret, Lionel & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 2005. "Aggregating partial, local evaluations to achieve global ranking," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 345(3), pages 705-712.
More about this item
KeywordsAsymmetric information; Internet commerce; Reputation mechanism;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C39 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Other
- C49 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Other
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-NET-2003-08-17 (Network Economics)
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