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Do European computer-related patents increase welfare?


  • Pia Weiss

    (Chemnitz University of Technology)


When the home country introduces a patent law after the winner of the patent race is known the country's welfare may rise only if the domestic firm wins. If the home country decides before the patent race ends, the welfare may be increased when the probability that the domestic firm wins is sufficiently large. In both cases, the conditions on the product market determine the welfare gain and one may at least doubt whether those conditions are satisfied.

Suggested Citation

  • Pia Weiss, 2004. "Do European computer-related patents increase welfare?," Development and Comp Systems 0402007, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0402007
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, 2007. "An Empirical Look at Software Patents," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 157-189, March.
    2. Robert M. Hunt, 1999. "Nonobviousness and the incentive to innovate: an economic analysis of intellectual property reform," Working Papers 99-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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    More about this item


    Patents; competition policy; intellectual property rights;

    JEL classification:

    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods

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