Dualistic distinctions and the development of pareyo's general theories of economic and social equilibrium
This study examines the role of dualisms in Pareto's theoretical approach to economic and social equilibrium, with particular reference to the shift in his treatment of broad social phenomena as an aspect of applied economics to the subject of general social theory. It is suggested that dualisms associated with Pareto's recognition of ongoing interaction between subjective and objective social phenomena (or endogenous preferences in modem parlance) enabled the inductive-deductive-inductive sequence, utilised in the 1900 "Sunto di alcuni capitoli di un nuovo trattato di economia pura", to provide the foundation for sound general social theory in circumstances where theory deduced from a hypothetical postulate fails to derive resu1ts that accord with observed fact. One consequence of this new approach is an increased emphasis on the relativistic limits of social science and the study of welfare.
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- Luigino Bruni & Francesco Guala, 2001. "Vilfredo Pareto and the Epistemological Foundations of Choice Theory," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 21-49, Spring.
- Marchionatti, Roberto & Gambino, Enrico, 1997. "Pareto and Political Economy as a Science: Methodological Revolution and Analytical Advances in Economic Theory in the 1890s," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1322-48, December.
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