On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces
We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if starting from any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves we are able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterization of all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. We describe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.
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