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Criminal revenue, civic returns: how illicit taxation boosts electoral participation

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  • Jessie Trudeau

Abstract

How does criminal group taxation affect participation in elections? I argue that criminal groups that tax public service provision use it as a technology of governance, which gives them a comparative advantage in voter mobilization. I predict that higher levels of criminal taxes on services ultimately lead to higher levels of voter participation, and contrast the service provision mechanism with other mechanisms related to coercive taxation and bottom-up reactions to being taxed.

Suggested Citation

  • Jessie Trudeau, 2025. "Criminal revenue, civic returns: how illicit taxation boosts electoral participation," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2025-86, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2025-86
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jordan Gans‐Morse & Sebastián Mazzuca & Simeon Nichter, 2014. "Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(2), pages 415-432, April.
    2. Rodrigo Zarazaga S.J., 2015. "Plugged in brokers: A model of vote-buying and access to resources," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 18, pages 369-390, November.
    3. Rodrigo Zarazaga, 2015. "Plugged in Brokers: A Model of Vote-Buying and Access to Resources," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 369-390, November.
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