Social Preferences and Public Economics: Are good laws a substitute for good citizens?
Laws and policies designed to harness self-regarding preferences to public ends may fail when they compromise the beneficial effects of pro-social preferences. Experimental evidence indicates that incentives that appeal to self interest may reduce the salience of intrinsic motivation, reciprocity, and other civic motives. Motivational crowding in also occurs. The evidence for these processes is reviewed and a model of optimal explicit incentives is presented. JEL Categories: D64, D52, H41, H21, Z13, C92
|Date of creation:||Jan 2007|
|Date of revision:||Mar 2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Thompson Hall, Amherst, MA 01003|
Web page: http://www.umass.edu/economics
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ums:papers:2007-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Daniele Girardi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.