Social Preferences and Public Economics: Are good laws a substitute for good citizens?
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- Bernasconi, Michele & Corazzini, Luca & Marenzi, Anna, 2013. "‘Expressive’ obligations in public good games: Crowding-in and crowding-out effects," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 13-24.
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KeywordsSocial preferences; implementation theory; incentive contracts; incomplete contracts; framing; behavioral experiments; motivational crowding out; ethical norms; constitutions;
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-02-10 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2007-02-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EVO-2007-02-10 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-02-10 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2007-02-10 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2007-02-10 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-02-10 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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