Cultural Variation in the Theory of the Firm
This paper presents a model of the firm that includes the possibility of firm and employee-on-the-job decision making based on alternatives to profit and utility maximization. Such alternatives are relevant and significant when explaining firm activity in cultural environments in which self interest is not considered to be a primary force driving human behavior. Three types of firms are defined and their properties compared: the Western firm, the Japanese firm, and the clan. The third is a combination of the first two. JEL Categories: D21, Z19
|Date of creation:||Mar 2005|
|Date of revision:|
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- Donald W. Katzner, 1999. "Western Economics and the Economy of Japan," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 21(3), pages 503-521, April.
- Blinder Alan S., 1993. "A Simple Note on the Japanese Firm," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 238-255, September.
- Katzner, Donald W., 2001. "Explaining the Japanese economic miracle," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 303-319, August.
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