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Strategic Thinking in Jury Decisions: An Experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Can Celebi

    (University of Mannheim)

  • Stefan Penczynski

    (School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, University of East Anglia)

Abstract

Theoretical work by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) has shown how strategic voting undermines the intuition that unanimous voting eliminates convictions of innocent defendants. We set up a level-k model of jury voting and experimentally investigate strategic thinking with an experimental design that uses intra-team communication. Looking at juries using the unanimity rule, we show that the jury performance depends on the strategic sophistication of jury members, which in turn depends on the complexity of the task at hand.

Suggested Citation

  • Can Celebi & Stefan Penczynski, 2023. "Strategic Thinking in Jury Decisions: An Experimental Study," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 23-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    • Handle: RePEc:uea:wcbess:23-01
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1721-1770, November.
    2. Guarnaschelli, Serena & McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2000. "An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 407-423, June.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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