Changes in social welfare in an intertemporal economy
General Equilibrium Theory (GE) scrutinizes the ability of markets to achieve efficient allocation of resources. The main purpose of this work is, in the framework to the GE to analyze, the possibility of design a mechanism enabling agents to make independent decisions compatible with social welfare. More precisely, we address the problem of the possibility of decentralization mechanism to sustain efficiency and social welfare at the same time. Specifically, introducing a social utility function, we argue on the possibility of improving the social welfare transferring resources between periods of the economy. This mechanism introduces a Rawlsian solution improving the welfare of the individuals worst positioned.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (598) 2410-6449
Fax: (598) 2410-6450
Web page: http://www.fcs.edu.uy/subcategoria.php?SubCatId=48&CatId=53
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Willmann, Gerald, 2004. "Pareto gains from trade: a dynamic counterexample," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 199-204, May.
- T. Bergstrom, 1971. "On the Existence and Optimality of Competitive Equilibrium for a Slave Economy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 23-36.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:1611. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Irene Musio)or (Héctor Pastori)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.