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Changes in social welfare in an intertemporal economy


  • Elvio Accinelli

    () (Facultad de Economía, Universidad Autónoma de san Luis Potosí. Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)

  • Leobardo Plata

    () (Facultad de Economía, Universidad Autónoma de san Luis Potosí.)

  • Joss Sánchez

    () (Facultad de Economía, Universidad Autónoma de san Luis Potosí.)


General Equilibrium Theory (GE) scrutinizes the ability of markets to achieve efficient allocation of resources. The main purpose of this work is, in the framework to the GE to analyze, the possibility of design a mechanism enabling agents to make independent decisions compatible with social welfare. More precisely, we address the problem of the possibility of decentralization mechanism to sustain efficiency and social welfare at the same time. Specifically, introducing a social utility function, we argue on the possibility of improving the social welfare transferring resources between periods of the economy. This mechanism introduces a Rawlsian solution improving the welfare of the individuals worst positioned.

Suggested Citation

  • Elvio Accinelli & Leobardo Plata & Joss Sánchez, 2011. "Changes in social welfare in an intertemporal economy," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1611, Department of Economics - dECON.
  • Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:1611

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. T. Bergstrom, 1971. "On the Existence and Optimality of Competitive Equilibrium for a Slave Economy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 23-36.
    2. Willmann, Gerald, 2004. "Pareto gains from trade: a dynamic counterexample," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 199-204, May.
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    More about this item


    Welfare; efficiency; decentralization;

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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