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IMF Quotas, Representation and Governance

Author

Listed:
  • Karen Taylor

    (Treasury, Government of Australia)

  • Craig Tipping

    (Treasury, Government of Australia)

  • Adam McKissack

    (Treasury, Government of Australia)

Abstract

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a cooperative institution established to meet the common objectives of international financial stability and economic growth. The IMF's legitimacy and effectiveness in fulfilling these objectives depends critically on its ability to adequately represent all its membership. The paper reviews the evolution of the IMF's representational arrangements, particularly the quota shares of members. It also canvasses alternative ways of measuring relative economic weight. It concludes that, despite difficulties in measuring the relative economic importance of member countries, a pattern of over- and under-representation is apparent, with East Asia being particularly under-represented. The paper also seeks to put the quotas issue into perspective, noting there are a range of factors that impact on the representation of IMF members, including strategic use of voting blocs and the use of the constituency system. Finally, the paper suggests a more general examination of the operations of the IMF Executive Board could provide further insights into questions of effectiveness of representation at the institution.

Suggested Citation

  • Karen Taylor & Craig Tipping & Adam McKissack, 2004. "IMF Quotas, Representation and Governance," Treasury Working Papers 2004-03, The Treasury, Australian Government, revised Nov 2004.
    • Handle: RePEc:tsy:wpaper:wpaper_tsy_wp_2004_3
    as

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    File URL: http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/929/PDF/Treasury_Working_Paper_2004-03.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dennis Leech, 2002. "Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 375-397, January.
    2. Hexner, Ervin P., 1964. "The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund: A Decision-Making Instrument," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 74-96, January.
    3. Gordon de Brouwer, 2004. "Institutions to Promote Financial Stability: Reflections on East Asia and an Asian Monetary Fund," Treasury Working Papers 2004-02, The Treasury, Australian Government, revised Sep 2004.
    4. Michael D. Bordo & Harold James, 2000. "The International Monetary Fund: Its Present Role in Historical Perspective," NBER Working Papers 7724, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jonathan R. Strand, 2003. "Measuring voting power in an international institution: the United States and the inter-American development bank," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 19-36, April.
    6. Martin Parkinson & Adam McKissack, 2003. "The IMF and the Challenge of Relevance in the International Financial Architecture," Treasury Working Papers 2003-01, The Treasury, Australian Government, revised Oct 2003.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

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