Subjectively Envy-Free Allocation: Characterization and Existence
We consider a framework in which each individual has his/her own concept of fairness and a social planner chooses an allocation that everyone feels fair. We say that an allocation is subjectively envy-free if no one envies the well-being of others under the allocation. We show that the subjectively envy-free allocation coincides, under different assumptions on individuals' information about others, with the well-known notions of fair allocation due to Rawls (1971) and Foley (1967). The result implies that depending on the circumstances of the society the concept of fairness changes. We also study conditions which guarantee the existence of a subjectively envy-free allocation.
|Date of creation:||09 Sep 1995|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario|
Phone: (416) 978-5283
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- H. R. Varian, 1973.
"Equity, Envy and Efficiency,"
115, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- M. Kaneko, 1984. "On interpersonal utility comparisons," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 1(3), pages 165-175, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:yamashig-95-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RePEc Maintainer)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.