A committee decides by unanimity whether to accept the current alternative, or to continue costly search. Alternatives are described by several distinct attributes. Each committee member privately assesses the quality of one attribute (her \
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- Bruno Strulovici, 2010.
"Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation,"
Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 933-971, May.
- Bruno Strulovici, 2008. "Learning while voting: determinants of collective experimentation," Economics Papers 2008-W08, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2001. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1478-1497, December.
- Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 1999. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," NBER Working Papers 7158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2000. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0341, Econometric Society.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Leeat Yariv, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 893-921, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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