IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

GPs' preferences: What price fee-for-service?


  • Peter Zweifel

    () (Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich)

  • Maurus Rischatsch

    () (Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich)

  • Angelika Braendle



In mixed health care systems a crucial condition for the success of Managed Care (MC) plans is to win over a su±cient number of general practitioners (GPs) acting as gatekeepers. This contribution reports on GPs' willingness-to-accept (WTA) or compensation asked, respectively, for changing from conventional fee-for-service to MC practice. Some 175 Swiss GPs participated in discrete choice experiments which permit to put a money value on their status quo bias. Regardless of whether effects coding or dummy coding is used to measure status quo bias, Swiss GPs require at least 16 percent of their current average income to give up fee-for-service in favor of MC practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Zweifel & Maurus Rischatsch & Angelika Braendle, 2009. "GPs' preferences: What price fee-for-service?," SOI - Working Papers 0910, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
  • Handle: RePEc:soz:wpaper:0910

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: first version, 2009
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Pauly, Mark V., 1994. "Editorial: A re-examination of the meaning and importance of supplier-induced demand," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 369-372, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:ecoser:v:22:y:2016:i:pa:p:193-201 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    general practitioners; willingness-to-pay; preferences; market experiments; managed care; effects coding; status quo bias;

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:soz:wpaper:0910. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marita Kieser). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.