Moving-Horizon Control in Dynamic Games
We consider a continuous-time system influenced by different agents who adopt moving-horizon control. The well-known Nash equilibrium concept is used to define two concepts for solutions fitting into the moving-horizon structure. One of them is analyzed in more detail among the class of linear quadratic games. The (dis)advantages of the moving-horizon control are illustrated by means of a government debt stabilization model.
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