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Unemployment Insurance and Redistributive Taxation

Author

Listed:
  • Robin Boadway
  • Andrew Oswald

Abstract

This paper studies the simultaneous determination of the socially optimal levels of unemployment insurance, income taxation and experience rating. Earlier work uses models in which there is no point for government intervention. There is only a rationale for state unemployment insurance when there is also a need for redistributive taxation.

Suggested Citation

  • Robin Boadway & Andrew Oswald, 1982. "Unemployment Insurance and Redistributive Taxation," Working Paper 466, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:466
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Björklund, Anders & Holmlund, Bertil, 1986. "The Economics of Unemployment Insurance: The Case of Sweden," Working Paper Series 167, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. Peter Backus & Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2014. "Is income redistribution a form of insurance, a public good or both?," Working Papers 2014/33, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    3. Roland Vaubel, 2012. "Redistribution as income insurance?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 389-392, September.
    4. Huizinga, H.P., 1996. "Unemployment Benefits and Redistributive Taxes in the Presence of Labor Quality Externalities," Other publications TiSEM 460a1387-fe15-4f62-b8a6-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Peter G. Backus & Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2017. "Risk aversion and inequity aversion in demand for unemployment benefits," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(2), pages 198-220, April.
    6. Vijlbrief, J.A., 1992. "Equity and efficiency in unemployment insurance," Serie Research Memoranda 0014, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    7. Peter Backus & Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2013. "What drives demand for redistribution? An empirical analysis of other-regarding and self-insurance motives," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1325, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    8. Rafael Di Tella & Robert J. MacCulloch, 2002. "The Determination of Unemployment Benefits," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 404-434, Part.
    9. Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau, 1994. "Time inconsistency as a rationale for public unemployment insurance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 1(2), pages 107-126, October.
    10. Richard Martin & Steeve Mongrain & Sean Parkinson, 2004. "Severance Payments and Unemployment Insurance: A Commitment Issue," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(4), pages 593-606, October.
    11. Peter Backus & Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2014. "Is income redistribution a form of insurance, a public good or both?," Working Papers 2014/33, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L68 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Appliances; Furniture; Other Consumer Durables

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