Moral hazard, optimal healthcare-seeking behavior, and competitive equilibrium
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- Sergey MALAKHOV, 2017. "Moral Hazard, Optimal Healthcare-Seeking Behavior, and Competitive Equilibrium," Expert Journal of Economics, Sprint Investify, vol. 5(2), pages 71-79.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsmoral hazard; health insurance; healthcare seeking behavior; optimal consumption-leisure choice;
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-09-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2017-09-17 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HEA-2017-09-17 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2017-09-17 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2017-09-17 (Microeconomics)
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