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Moral hazard, optimal healthcare-seeking behavior, and competitive equilibrium

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  • Malakhov, Sergey

Abstract

The theory of the optimal-consumption leisure choice under price dispersion describes the phenomenon of moral hazard as the customer’s reaction on unfair insurance policy. The unfair insurance offer does not equalize marginal costs of propensity to seek healthcare with marginal benefits on purchase. Under unfair insurance policy consumers increase ex post healthcare seeking activities and they optimize their consumption of medical services. The analysis of moral hazard results in the assumption that for an unfair offer there is an increase in the time horizon of the insurance policy that makes it fair and moral hazard becomes inefficient. The time horizon competition between insurance companies can eliminate moral hazard effect that clears the way to the competitive equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Malakhov, Sergey, 2017. "Moral hazard, optimal healthcare-seeking behavior, and competitive equilibrium," MPRA Paper 81352, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:81352
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Çaatay Koç, 2005. "Health-Specific Moral Hazard Effects," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 98-118, July.
    2. Sergey MALAKHOV, 2016. "Law of One Price and Optimal Consumption-Leisure Choice Under Price Dispersion," Expert Journal of Economics, Sprint Investify, vol. 4(1), pages 1-8.
    3. Sergey MALAKHOV, 2015. "Propensity to Search: Common, Leisure, and Labor Models of Consumer Behavior," Expert Journal of Economics, Sprint Investify, vol. 3(1), pages 63-76.
    4. Sergey Malakhov, 2014. "Satisficing Decision Procedure and Optimal Consumption-Leisure Choice," International Journal of Social Science Research, Macrothink Institute, vol. 2(2), pages 138-151, September.
    5. Mark Aguiar & Erik Hurst, 2007. "Measuring Trends in Leisure: The Allocation of Time Over Five Decades," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(3), pages 969-1006.
    6. Zweifel, Peter & Manning, Willard G., 2000. "Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care," Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 409-459 Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Malakhov, Sergey, 2018. "Limits to the «theorem of lemons»: demand for good cars under equilibrium price dispersion," MPRA Paper 88594, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    moral hazard; health insurance; healthcare seeking behavior; optimal consumption-leisure choice;

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private

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