Le système algérien de protection sociale : entre Bismarckien et Beveridgien[The Algerian social protection system: between Bismarckian and Beveridgian]

Social security systems are often treated according to their epistemology. The bismarckian and beverdgian systems could be the origin of all social protection systems. The firs was created by Bismark at 1883 in Germany, it was based on the insurance principal. The beverigian system was instituted by the lord Beveridge in Great Britain on 1941, it was financed by taxes, its aim was to extend social coverage to the biggest part of population. Otherwise, We can distinguish between three cluster of social protection systems according intervention degrees of different actors (State, market and family). The first cluster is the “liberal” welfare state, characterized by means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, and modest social-insurance plans. This welfare state provides very limited social rights. The second cluster is the “corporatist” type. In this type the focus is on preserving status differentials. Rights are therefore attached to status. The state may play a role in de-commodification, but it has a very limited role in redistribution. Corporatist regimes are typically shaped by the church, and as such have a conservative orientation and an ideological commitment to the family. The third cluster is the “universalist” welfare state, in which welfare state benefits are extended to the middle class in an attempt to avoid a dualism between state and market. How about the Algerian social protection system? It was been created on 1949, in the first years of its creation the system was contributive. The Algerian social protection system has undergone several reforms since independence. Some laws have been established to extend coverage to higher part of population. This extending was carried out through ‘’beverdgian’’ principle. It means to provide benefit to the poor population without counterpart of contribution. This gives deficit of the treasury of the social security funds. Otherwise, evolution in Algerian macroeconomic context, the passage form planned economy to the open market economy and the disability for the government to reach full employment have given some new forms of informal employment. On 2011, 46% of economically active population hasn’t any social coverage (Office National des Statistiques). These workers don’t pay their social contribution but can get benefit like entitled of an insured or thanks to free health care. We will try in this paper to analyse the social security system in parallel with labor market, we emphasize the public intervention on social security system, the degree of this intervention to explain the general trend of evolution that undergone the Algerian social security sytem.We use national account data to compare the potential revenue could coming from the labor market with the actual revenue collected by social security funds. This comparison shows some contribution shortfall for the social security funds. However, the second section of this paper exposes the evolution of social coverage rate. The low demand of social security by the workers seem to be widespread in all the sectors, and a lot off clusters of profession, manly self workers and employers. It could be the result of some behaviors, like risk taking, high discount rate of the future or the individualistic behavior of the employers that don’t entitle their employees to social security (Luttmer et al, 2012. Brown et al, 2013; Friedman, 1973, Murphy 2011). Face to this, the state continue to subsidies the social security system and providing benefits to poorer categories of population using his social budget. The amount of this last is increasing this last years (ONS) accentuating the beverdgian principle. This kind of social protection system work under demographic and financial pressure. The problem is that the social budget is financed by oil taxes (exhaustible resource), hence, the sustainability of the Algerian social security system.